

# The Effect of Boko Haram Insurgent on the Growth of Tertiary Institutions in North Eastern Region of Nigeria: A Case Study of Four Selected Institutions (2015-2024)

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**Abstract**—the general study explores on how the ongoing Boko Haram insurgent activities in North-Eastern Nigeria

are adversely affecting tertiary education performance in the region. It investigates the effect of the sect's activities on student enrollment, academic performance, infrastructure development, and career mobility of academic staff in four selected tertiary institutions: University of Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, College of Agriculture Gujba (now in Damaturu due to Boko Haram attack), and Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam. Findings reveal reduced enrollment, declining academic performance, staff departures, facility destruction, and hindered infrastructure development as consequences of the insurgency. Policy recommendations include bolstering security within and around Tertiary institutions and providing lucrative risk allowances package for academic staff in the North-East region. The study employed both qualitative and quantitative research methods.

**Key words:** *Boko Haram, Effect, Insurgent, North-East, Region of Nigeria.*

## INTRODUCTION

Boko Haram, a jihadist rebel group, launched an armed uprising against the Nigerian government in 2009, which signaled the start of the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria (Akimbi, 2015). Around 250,000 individuals have fled from Nigeria into Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria out of the 2.3 million internally displaced by the insurgency (Buchanan, 2015). In 2014 alone, Boko Haram was responsible for over 6,600 deaths (Nicholas, 2015), including the high-profile mass abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in April of that year. Boko Haram is considered the deadliest terrorist organization in the world, based on the number of people it has killed and the property it has destroyed due to the ongoing insurgency (BBC, 2016). In 2014 alone, there was a significant escalation in violence, with 10,849 deaths reported compared to the 1,000 deaths in 2013 (VN, 2016). Additionally, the insurgency expanded beyond Nigeria's borders, with attacks on Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, turning the conflict into a regional struggle. Following the konduga battle, in which Nigerian government forces forcibly drove Boko Haram out of the town in order to retake it. Abu Musab-al-Barnawi took Abubakar Shekau's place. The government forces revealed a picture of an insurgent killed in the battle as Shekau's dead body, announcing that Shekau had died. Shekau quickly recovered, using his customary method of communicating with the Nigerian government via the internet to declare that he had not been slain in the Konduga conflict and that he was still in charge of Boko Haram. The government forces subsequently verified that Shekau was not the insurgent slain. Additionally, Shekau is still living. (Buchanan, 2015). Later on, there were further reports suggesting that Shekau had been killed in a clash with

Joint Multinational Forces comprised of troops from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria at Amchide, a border town between Nigeria and Cameroon. Shekau resurfaced once again, asserting his survival and reaffirming his leadership of Boko Haram. He declared his intent to launch further assaults on

Nigerian government forces and civic institutions. True to his word, he targeted tertiary institutions in the North-Eastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe with increased frequency. The establishment of a state of emergency in Nigeria at the beginning of 2012, which was extended in 2013 to cover the entire northeastern region, led to an increase in both security force abuses and militant attacks (Baba & Sheriff, 2018). Instead of curbing the insurgency, this escalation in violence resulted in a worsening of the situation compared to the period before the state of emergency was declared.

The confusion and controversial conditions created under the state of emergency rule have not yet been addressed. Killings rose, brutality increased, and civilians became helpless, as some attacks on highways were carried out by individuals whose affiliations

whether insurgents or Nigerian government forces could not be ascertained. The security scenario in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states became increasingly unclear, with the distinction between those fighting in defense of national interest and those killing in the name of God becoming relatively blurred. Insurgents devised various strategies to counter government forces' tactics, further complicating the situation. Anxiety rose higher than ever before, and the military's transfer of aggression onto innocent civilians grew over time, leading many citizens to flee their homes in anticipation of possible aggressive military raids. This also contributed to the increasing number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) caused by the insurgency (Nicholas, 2015). The federal government of Nigeria's attempt to impose a state of emergency in northeastern Nigeria has not succeeded in quelling the insurgency that the area is experiencing. The Military's purported occupation of the Sambisa forest and the construction of Camp Zero there haven't stopped attacks in the area either. When an insurgency first starts, it might be contained, but once it spreads, fire power rarely puts an end to it. Sometimes insurgencies last longer than anticipated. It does not go away quickly, and no amount

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of military might has ever been able to put an end to it globally. It terminates naturally when its strategists and sponsors pass away.

In another, it melted and subdued itself into groups of factions led by different people who were fighting for the same goal. It also occasionally split up into factions, with various lords battling one another for a lack of a common goal, which decreased the involvement of government forces. In certain Instances, discourse has succeeded in taming it instead of military force, but a resurgence of it has been observed with the emergence of agreements broken by conflicting parties. Although the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria continues, there has been a decline in attack waves and an increase In light of the military's successes in neutralizing attacks and expelling insurgents, these developments imply that the conflict, which many believed would be prolonged, may not conclude as quickly as expected. Attacks on higher education institutions in the northeastern region of Nigeria, which are frequent results of Boko Haram's operations, are still occurring and are having a detrimental effect on the growth of these institutions.

The University of Maiduguri has experienced a halt in the advancement of its reputation for academic excellence due to Boko Haram's persistent attacks on the institution. The bombing of the Federal Polytechnic students' hostel at Wuro-Fatoji in Mubi resulted in a significant setback for the institutions' growth in tertiary education. The massacre of hundreds of students by Boko Haram in the College of Agriculture's dormitory in Gujba severely impacted the college's overall operations and stability. Additionally, the persistent attacks on Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, which included the bombardment and destruction of academic centers and facilities, have hindered the growth of tertiary education. The ongoing actions of the group are a serious impediment to the development of higher education in northeastern Nigeria. Tertiary education aims to help individuals utilize their talents

and societal opportunities for self-fulfillment. It focuses on meeting a country's developmental needs and socio-cultural demands. Tertiary education provides a platform for individuals to develop their potential and addresses the need for high-level manpower in society. Its objectives include fostering cultural and material growth to meet individuals' lifelong learning needs and aspirations, ultimately producing graduates who are effective leaders, valued community members, and responsible global citizens (Iruonagbe et al., 2015). Tertiary education institutions ensure their knowledge remains relevant, identify skills gaps, create specialized programs, and build necessary skills to enhance economic prosperity and social cohesion. They adapt workforce development to economic changes and new skill demands and promote national cohesion and societal development. Therefore, tertiary education in every country is guided by a philosophy that addresses specific issues arising from the existence of universities and tertiary institutions (Saint et al., 2003). Since the 1980s, the decay across all education levels has been monumental, with facilities nearly collapsing and teacher and lecturer morale at its lowest. The Boko Haram insurgency has further exacerbated these issues, significantly affecting the environment conducive to teaching and learning, particularly in the North-East region of Nigeria.

#### **PROBLEM STATEMENT**

In Nigeria, one of the ongoing conflicts is the insurgency led by Boko Haram. Although it began as an internal conflict, it quickly extended beyond Nigeria's borders into Cameroun, Chad, and Niger, henceforth being referred to as a regional conflict rather than an internal one. The conflict translated in destruction of socio-economic and political activities across the North-East Region of Nigeria with Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States been the most affected part of the region (Baba, 2016). As the insurgency persisted, numerous studies were conducted over time. Some of the studies among others have offered a number of policy suggestions on

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the impact of the conflict on the state and development of socio- economic and political activities in the region (Higazi, 2013).

- 1-What is the effect of the conflict on the Growth of tertiary education in the region?
- 2-Why have previous research suggestions failed to improve the problem?
- 3-And how can the problem be Improve?

The effect of the conflict on the growth of Higher education in the three most affected states in the region was largely neglected. This could be because, while the insurgency persists, a thorough investigation into the status and circumstances of postsecondary education in the states has not been carried out. Furthermore, this could also be the reason why early research recommendations have not been able to stop the decline in tertiary education standards brought on by the conflict in the three states that have been mentioned.

To arrive at an unbiased conclusion regarding the effect of the conflict on tertiary education development and potential remedies, it's essential to comprehensively assess the state of tertiary education in the region both pre-conflict and during the conflict period.

Previous studies have all adopted the qualitative method of inquiry into the impact of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria`s north east region (Iweze, 2014). Though, none of the studies has been able to explore the impact of the insurgency on the Growth of tertiary education in the region. And, primary method was not adopted in initial related studies. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are jointly needed to be able to acquire sufficient knowledge of the insurgency, its impact on the growth of tertiary education and policy suggestions on how it can be ameliorated. The preceding discussions have underscored the gaps in knowledge, particularly in methodology and in exploring the influence of the ongoing insurgency on tertiary education development in the North East region. The aim to address these identified research gaps is what necessitates the proposed study.

## **OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY**

The study's objectives are:

- Investigate how the Boko Haram insurgency affects student enrollment at the University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Gujba.
- Identify how the insurgency affected the academic performance of students at University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Gujba.
- Identify how the insurgency affects academic staff occupational stability and mobility at University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Mubi.
- Investigate how the insurgency affects infrastructure development in four tertiary institutions.

## **RESEARCH QUESTION**

The study includes the following questions:

- How has the Boko Haram insurgency affected student enrollment at the University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Gujba?
- How has the insurgency affected the academic performance of students at University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Gujba?
- How has the insurgency affected academic staff stability and mobility at the University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Mubi?
- How has the insurgency affected infrastructure development at four tertiary institutions?

## **HYPOTHESIS**

The hypotheses formulated to guide the study are;

**H 1:** The insurgency in the North East region has a significant negative impact on the occupational

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stability of academic staff in the University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Mubi.

**H 2:** There is a significant relationship between the level of insecurity caused by the insurgency and the mobility of academic staff in the aforementioned institutions.

**H 3:** Academic staff in the University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Mubi exhibit varying degrees of occupational stability and mobility based on their personal characteristics, such as age, gender, years of experience, and academic rank.

**H 4:** Institutional factors, such as the availability of security measures, organizational support, and resources, significantly influence the occupational stability and mobility of academic staff in the context of the insurgency in the North East region.

**H 5:** There are differences in the perceived impact of the insurgency on academic staff occupational stability and mobility among the University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and College of Agriculture Mubi due to Variations in the intensity of the conflict and institutional contexts.

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The insurgency in north-east Nigeria occurred against the backdrop of long-standing religious violence between Nigeria's Muslim and Christian communities (Nossiter, 2015). However, Boko Haram has consistently stated that it is fighting to establish an Islamic state and law in Nigeria. However, the fact that more Muslims are attacked and killed in the conflict than people of any other religion provides sufficient evidence to support the claim that the group is fighting for the sake of Islam. Most of the communities attacked and displaced in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, which are battlegrounds, were Muslim rather than Christian. Suicide bombings in most of Nigeria's soft

spots have killed more Muslims than Christians (Windsor 2015). Several

Muslim Ulamas in major towns, particularly in Borno and Yobe states, have been attacked, with a few killed, particularly in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital (More, 2015). There are few camps where Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are settled that are not populated by Muslims. This implies that Boko Haram affiliated the insurgency with Islam in order to deceive ignorant young people who were willing to fight and die in the name of God into joining the group and increasing the number of combatants required to take up arms against the Nigerian state and authority (Baba, 2018).

In mid-2014, Boko Haram captured swathes of territory in and around their home state of Borno, estimated to be 50,000 square kilometers (20, 000 square miles). Boko Haram did not capture Maiduguri, the Borno state capital where the group was originally based, but it held on to the territory it had captured and controlled until January 2015 (Karimi & Abubakar, 2015). However, the Nigerian Armed Forces quickly revealed that they had destroyed all Boko Haram camps (Baba and Sheriff, 2018).

Contrary to this revelation's observation, conquered territories have been liberated if all Boko Haram camps have been destroyed. If conquered territories have truly been liberated, Internally Displaced People (IDPs) no longer need to be kept in various camps where hardships due to a lack of facilities are the norm. We can recognize that before IDPs can return to their respective communities, repairs, particularly the reconstruction of damaged facilities, must be completed (Lamb, 2016).

The core concern lies in the timeframe within which the Nigerian government will act to address the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs), many of whom have already lost hope in the prospect of rebuilding their lives with the chance of achieving a higher level and standard of living than before (Akimbi, 2015). In May 2013, Boko Haram gained control over a significant area in the northern and central regions of Borno state, including Damboa in the southern part of the state. Nigerian forces were already engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Borno and Yobe

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states as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF) at that time. The Department of State Services provided intelligence services in the area, and the riot police, also known as mobile police, were involved in the military operation. Due to the large landmass of the states and the challenges faced by the JTF in patrolling the entire region during the insurgency, military operations were mainly focused on larger towns like Maiduguri and military barracks. Boko Haram took advantage of this challenge by establishing bases and camps in areas with less military presence. Later, they expanded their operations into the vast Sambisa savanna forest, which covered much of southern Borno and even some of Yobe. As government forces expanded, Boko Haram was eventually driven out of some of the areas where camps and bases had been established, allowing the group to resume its attacks in mid-May 2013. Aerial bombing was used to target several Boko Haram camps. Furthermore, rather than halting the conflict's escalation, the insurgency grew stronger as a result of various counterstrategies spawned by Boko Haram's waves of attacks (DHQ, 2015).

Military operations against insurgency continue in Nigeria's northeast. However, some details about the situation became hazy, especially after the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in the area. Due to the suspension of mobile phone service following this declaration, the public was unable to obtain detailed information about the insurgency and the humanitarian crises it was causing. Mobile phone networks were shut down in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, forcing people to rely on press reports from Maiduguri, Borno's capital, for information. Because of a lack of communication, statistics on those affected by the insurgency, those fleeing affected areas, and those killed in the conflict became distorted and imprecise.

On May 14, 2013, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in response to the militant group Boko Haram's growing violence and the desire to

put an end to it. In the three states covered by the emergency decree, the reaction to Boko Haram's increasing violence as a result of its resistance to secular and westernizing influences caused severe psychological trauma. Since the late 1970s, the Tijjaniya and Qadiriyya, two prominent Sufi orders, have been targeted by reformist Salafi/Wahhabi groups in northern Nigeria. This long-standing issue gave rise to Boko Haram, an extremist group that broke away from the reformist Salafi/Wahhabi organizations. Boko Haram's ideology selectively adopts a variety of Salafi viewpoints, while maintaining that Muslims should follow the laws and customs established by the Prophet Muhammad and his first three generations of disciples, known as the "pious predecessors" (al-salaf al-salih).

While Salafis place great emphasis on the "restoration of Islamic doctrines to a pure form," the early twentieth-century Salafiyya movement also strongly embraced modernist ideals that supported educational reform and the pursuit of science. And technological expertise (Baba & Sambo, 2016).

Boko Haram's ideology differs from Salafi doctrine in that it rejects secular education and any involvement with the government or civil service. Boko Haram employs technology, such as smartphones and the internet, and its members have learned how to make explosives, such as car bombs, using technical methods. It appears that they are willing to use the information if it helps their political or religious cause.

The majority of Boko Haram's strongholds in northeastern Nigeria have clearly fallen to the militant group. The government forces have also taken control of large uninhabited areas where they have established bases and camps, driving the insurgents out. However, the group's recent resurgence of attacks lends credence to the theory that its remnants have relocated to more peripheral areas of Borno and crossed Nigeria's borders into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Villages in the Gwoza Hills, a northeastern extension of the Mandara Mountains that stretches from northeastern Nigeria into Cameroon, have suffered as a result of insurgents retreating from the forested bush into mountainous caves, including Sambisa Forest Reserve

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and surrounding areas. Have been adversely affected by the insurgency. Boko Haram fighters have attacked several villages and towns in the Gwoza Hills, killing many people and destroying property.

Due to these, a number of people living in Gwoza Hills and town were forced to relocate to the northern part of Adamawa state, but some chose to travel further, seeking safety in places such as Jos and even Abuja (Mark, 2015). In the meantime, troops have been stationed in the Gwoza Hills, combing the caves for guerilla fighters. The military has conducted some aerial bombing, and refugees from Nigeria have migrated into Cameroon's far north via the Mandara Mountains. There has also been military action in the northern and central regions of Borno, as fighters from Boko Haram and refugees are crossing the border into southern Niger, primarily to Diffa. As time goes on, hostilities are lessening, and focus in the northeast is shifting to how the insurgency has affected postsecondary education development, which many have confirmed has been badly impacted by the fighting. The pace at which postsecondary education is developing in the area is not only slow but also compassionate.

The growth of higher education in Nigeria's northeast is being hampered by a decline in student enrollment and subpar academic results, as well as by unstable employment conditions, a significant exodus of academic staff from the region's tertiary institutions to areas that are safer and more secure, and frequent attacks that destroy built-in infrastructure and facilities. The government of the nation must give these unpleasant experiences immediate attention. Despite the ongoing insurgency in the area, there is a pressing need for attention, especially regarding the potential strategies necessary to support and promote the development of effective tertiary education. In Nigeria, tertiary educational institutions encompass colleges of education, polytechnics, and universities. Currently, Nigeria has 262 accredited universities, consisting of 147 private, 63 state, and 52 federal institutions (NUC, 2023). Moreover, Nigeria hosts the

largest tertiary education system on the African continent, with 205 approved colleges of education and 179 approved polytechnics (Adesulu, 2013). Despite public universities historically dominating Nigeria's postsecondary education landscape, their challenges in managing the admission pressure became increasingly evident in the 1990s. However, because of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, there was less competition for admission to tertiary institutions in the Northeastern region of Nigeria from 2015 to 2020. The inaugural tertiary educational institution in Nigeria, Yaba Higher College, was founded in 1932.

Tertiary education encompasses diverse forms of education offered in postsecondary institutions, typically leading to the attainment of a named degree, diploma, or certificate of higher studies upon completion of a course of study.

The objective of higher education in Nigeria is structured to promote the country's economic advancement and global competitiveness by offering accessible, pertinent, and high-quality education in tertiary institutions. The aim is to consistently attract, nurture, and graduate capable, knowledgeable, and skilled individuals from these institutions, as outlined by (Adesina and Awonusi 2004). The primary objective of higher education is to cultivate graduates who possess the capacity to serve as proficient leaders in their respective fields, esteemed contributors to their communities, and conscientious global citizens. Tertiary education institutions play a pivotal role in ensuring the applicability of their knowledge, identifying skill deficiencies, establishing specialized programs, and fostering the acquisition of essential competencies. These efforts contribute to enhancing economic prosperity and social unity, aligning workforce development with evolving economic needs and demands, and generating pertinent knowledge conducive to advancing national economic growth, as highlighted by (Adesina and Awonusi 2004). The demand from Nigerians for a more comprehensive provision of tertiary education prompted the establishment of the Asquith

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and Elliot Commission on Higher Education. Their reports in 1943 advocated for the establishment of universities in Nigeria. Consequently, in 1948, the University College Ibadan was established as an affiliate of the University of London. This institution remained the sole university in Nigeria until 1960 (Akinyemi, 2013). In April 1959, the Nigerian government initiated an inquiry (Ashby Commission) to advise on the tertiary education requirements of the newly independent nation for its initial two decades. Before the submission of the report on September 2nd, 1960, the Eastern Region government established its own university in Nsukka, known as the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in 1960 (Obadara & Alaka, 2013). Historical development of tertiary education in Nigeria is a tale full of numerous sacrifices made by the country's founding fathers. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Before the 18th century, there was little or no difference between Europe and Africa, but the slave Trade, coupled with the industrial revolution in Europe, reshaped the socio-economic landscape. Africa became economically subservient to Europe and later became its colony. An analysis of the Nigerian educational system from 1842 to 1959 revealed a lack of emphasis on fostering "national consciousness," "national unity," "patriotism," or similar ideals. In fact, the colonial government made no attempt to cultivate a sense of national identity in Nigeria. The populace was categorized as either British subjects or British protected persons, expected to demonstrate loyalty to the British Empire and the reigning monarch. Consequently, instead of prioritizing technical education, the majority of citizens were educated in civics to assist British colonizers in administrative tasks (Aluede et al., 2012).

The National Policy on Education is anchored on Nigeria's philosophy on education as enunciated through the nation's objectives. Nigeria has five main national objectives as provided by the Second National Development Plan and accepted as the necessary foundation for the National Policy on Education. Nigeria's philosophy of tertiary education is

concerned with specific problems arising from the existence of universities and higher education institutions in the country. The aim of higher education is to meet the socio-cultural and developmental needs of a country (Dawodu, 2010). Tertiary education provides an opportunity for individuals to develop their potential. It fulfils the needs for high-level manpower in a society. Its objectives include cultural and material development. Tertiary education can lead to many benefits, such as Prosperous career and financial security (Iruonagbe et al., 2015). In the 21st century, education plays an even more significant role in other aspects of your life. Attaining a higher education can increase your opportunities and improve your overall quality of life (Abdulkareem et al., 2011). Poverty Reduction, connecting across borders, sense of accomplishment, more productivity, better communication, and critical thinking skills, identification of skills and greater sense of discipline are some of the benefits of tertiary education (Iruonagbe et al., 2015).

These benefits also accompanied the acquisition of tertiary education knowledge in Nigeria like in other countries of the world.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The study was conducted on four specific tertiary institutions located in Nigeria's North East region. These institutions include the University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and Yobe State College of Agriculture Gujba. The research design encompassed a nine-year period, from 2015 to 2024. The study employed both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. Secondary data were obtained from the establishment department and student affairs unit of the University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, and Yobe State College of Agriculture Gujba the four selected tertiary institutions included in the study. Printed materials such as newspapers, magazines, lecture notes, conference proceedings, seminars, and



workshop papers, as well as internet-based data, were utilized in the study. Primary data were collected through the administration of structured questionnaires to three hundred respondents systematically chosen from the four institutions involved in the study. Each institution was represented by seventy-five respondents, comprising twenty-five academic staff and fifty students. The questionnaire was administered separately in each of the institutions at different times and days. However, the structured items (questions) included in the questionnaire were the same for all institutions.

Correlation Analysis (CA) was used to analyze data obtained through the administration of structured questionnaire on the respondents on the four basic expected objectives on the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on students' enrollment, students' performances, academic staff occupational mobility, and infrastructural development, where statistical correlation was measured by coefficient correlation with numerical values ranging from Ho to 1.0 giving indication of the s Example:

$r > 0$  indicates a positive relationship.  
 $r < 0$  indicated negative relationship

#### **Strength of relationship**

The strength of the relationship increases as the coefficients approach +1.0 and -1.0, as shown below:  
Value or R Strength of the relationship.  
1.0 -----Strong Relationship (SR).  
0.5-----Moderate Relationship (MR):  
0.3...Weak Relationship (WR).  
0.1-----Very Weak Relationship (VWR).

As a result, 1.0 represents a strong relationship, 0.5 indicates a moderate relationship, 0.3 indicates a weak relationship, and 0.1 indicates a very weak relationship. Note that Q simply stands for Q=Question.

The questionnaire for the study was personally administered by the researcher in the four selected institutions, without the assistance of research assistants. The researcher visited each institution on separate days, starting with the University of Maiduguri in Borno State, followed by the Federal Polytechnic Mubi in Adamawa State, the College of Agriculture Gujba (temporarily operating in Damaturu, Yobe State due to an attack by Boko Haram insurgents), and finally, the Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam in Yobe State. Statistical tools such as frequency, percentage, mean, and standard deviation were utilized in analyzing the data and testing the hypotheses formulated for the study.

Understood. Here's a breakdown of the abbreviations used in the study:

- H = Hypotheses
- F = Frequency
- P = Percentage
- M = Mean
- SD = Standard Deviation

Additionally, the letter Q is used to refer to questions in the presentation and analysis of data in the study, Here's the interpretation of the abbreviations used for responses:

- SD = Strongly Disagreed
- D = Disagreed
- N = Neutral
- A= Agreed
- SA= Strongly Agreed

Additionally, the figure labeled "A" indicates the positions of the institutions with a star.



**Figure “A”:** Areas of Study marked with Stars

Source: <http://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Screen-Shot-2013-12-12-at-02.29.10.png>

*A. Data Presentation and Analysis*

**Table 1:** Correlation between Boko Haram Insurgency and the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria

<i>B. Questions</i>	<i>SR (1.0)</i>	<i>MR (0.5)</i>	<i>WR (0.3)</i>	<i>VWR (0.1)</i>	
Q1. Boko Haram insurgency has led to the reduction in number of students` enrollment in tertiary institutions in Nigeria`s North-East region.	270		15	10	05
Q2. The insurgency has not affected students` performances academically in tertiary institutions in the Region.	15	30	50	205	
Q3. Several academic facilities and infrastructures have been destroyed by the insurgency in tertiary Institutions in Northeast Nigeria.	250	30	15	05	
Q4. Some academic staff working in tertiary institutions in Nigeria`s North-East region have not left to other Institutions in safer regions outside the North- East.		16	22	32	230

Q-Question, SR (1.0)-Strong Relationship, MR (0.5)-Moderate Relationship, WR (0.3)-Weak Relationship and VWR (0.1)-Very Weak Relationship Source: Author`s field Survey (2024)

Table 1 shows a strong relationship (SR) on the view insurgency has not affected students`

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That,


Boko Haram insurgency has led to the reduction of in number of students` enrollment in tertiary institutions in Nigeria`s North-East region, a very weak relationship (VWR) on the position that, the

North-East Nigeria and a very weak relationship (VWR) on the assertion that, some academic staff

working in tertiary institutions in Nigeria`s North-East

Performances academically in tertiary institutions in the region, a strong relationship (SR) on the belief that, several academic facilities and infrastructures have been destroyed by the insurgency in tertiary institutions in

Region have not left to other institutions in safer regions outside the North-East.



**Figure 1.** Correlation between Boko Haram Insurgency and the development of tertiary education in North -East Nigeria

Q-Question, SR (1.0)-Strong Relationship, MR (0.5)-Moderate Relationship, WR (0.3)-Weak Relationship and VWR (0.1)-Very Weak Relationship Source: Author`s field survey (2024).

**Table 2:** The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Development of Tertiary Education in North East Nigeria

<u>A. Question</u>	<u>F/P</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>SD</u>
Q1. The level of students` enrollment in your school has increased from 2015-2024.		175 58.33%	65 21.67%	20 6.67%	25 8.33%	15 5%	60	3,620
Q2. Boko Haram insurgency from 2015-2024 has Impacted negatively on the level of students` enrollment in your school.		25 8.33%	45 15%	15 5%	80 26.67%	135 45%	60	1,900
Q3. Academic activities have not been interrupted by Boko Haram insurgency in your school from 2015 to 2024.		185 61.67%	60 20%	25 8.33%	20 6.67%	10 3.33%	60	4,190
Q4. Students` performances in continuous assessment and examinations have fallen low in your school because of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency.		10 3.33%	25 8.33%	15 5%	80 26.67%	170 56.67%	60	3,650
<u>Q5. There is adequate security</u>		<u>195</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>4,870</u>
For academic staff in your school from 2015 to 2024 due to Boko Haram Insurgency.		65%	20%	5%	6.67%	3.33%		
Q6. Several academic staff have left your school to institutions in other regions from 2015 to 2024 due to Boko Haram insurgency.		15 5%	20 6.67%	15 5%	55 18.34%	195 65%	60	4,780
Q7. Boko Haram insurgency has no negative impact on infrastructural development in your school from 2015 to 2024.		185 61.67%	70 23.33%	25 8.33%	15 5%	5 1.67%	60	4,400

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Q8. Developed facilities like Administrative block, classroom,	10	15	10	75	190	60	4,830
	3.33%	5%	3.33%	25%	63.34%		


Workshop, laboratory, hostel, ICT center, library, Entrepreneur and Skill acquisition center among other have been destroyed by Boko Haram insurgency in your institution

From 2015 to 2024. Q-Question, F/P=Frequency/Percentage, SD-Strongly Disagreed, D-Disagreed, N-Neutral, A- Agreed, SA-Strongly Agreed, M-Mean and SD-Standard Deviation Source: Author`s field survey (2024)

Table 2 shows that 58.33% of the respondents strongly differ with the view that, the level of students` enrollment in their school has increased from 2015- 2024, 21.67% disagreed, 6.67% were neutral, 8.33% agreed and only 5% of them strongly agreed the view. Also, on the position that, Boko Haram insurgency from 2015- 2024 has impacted negatively on the level of students` enrollment in their school, 8.33% of them strongly disagreed with the position, 15% disagreed with it, only 5% remained neutral while 26.67% disagreed and 45% strongly agreed with it. The position that, Academic activities have not been interrupted by Boko Haram insurgency in their school was strongly disagreed with by 61.67% of the respondents, 20% of them disagreed, 8.33% remained neutral, 6.67% disagreed and 3.33% of them strongly agreed with the position. It is also clearly demonstrated by table 2 that, 3.33% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, students` performances in continuous assessment and examinations have fallen low in their school because of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, 8.33% disagreed, 5% were neutral, 26.67% agreed and 56.67% of them strongly agreed. Also, 65% of them strongly disagreed with the position that, there is adequate security for academic staff in the

School from 2015 to 2024 due to the Boko Haram insurgency: 20% disagreed, 5% remained neutral, 6.67% agreed, and only 3.33% strongly agreed. Table 2 shows that from 2015 to 2024, 5% strongly disagreed, 6.67% disagreed, 5% chose neutrality, 18.34% agreed, and 65% strongly agreed. On the assertion that the Boko Haram insurgency has had no negative impact on infrastructural development in their school from 2015 to 2024, 61.67% strongly disagreed, 23.33% disagreed, 8.33% were neutral, 5% agreed, and only 1.67% strongly agreed.

Table 2 also demonstrated that, 3.33% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, developed facilities like administrative block, classroom, workshop, laboratory, hostel, ICT center, library, entrepreneur and skill acquisition center among other have been destroyed by Boko Haram insurgency in their institution from 2015 to 2024, 5% disagreed, another 3.33% of them remained neutral while 25% of them agreed and 63.34% of them strongly agreed. The average or mean score for all the Qs in table 2 is 60, and the mean or average SD score for all the Qs is 6,448.



**Figure 2.** The impact of Boko Haram insurgency on the development of tertiary education in North East Nigeria SQ-Question, SD: Strongly Disagreed. D-Disagreed, N-Neutral, A-Agreed, and SA-Strongly Agreed Source: Author's field survey, 2024.

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**Table 3: Testing the Research Hypotheses**


C. Hypotheses *F/P*

		D	N	A	SA	M	SD
H1; Boko Haram insurgency Has	10	15	20	75	180	60	4,150
Impact on students' enrollment.	3.33%	5%	6.67%	25%	60%		
H2; Boko Haram insurgency Has	20	25	15	65	175	60	3,620
impact on the academic performances	6.67%	8.33%	5%	21.67%	58.33%		
Of students`.							
H3; Boko Haram insurgency has	15	20	10	70	185	60	4,370
impact on academic staff	5%	6.67%	3.33%	23.33%	61.67%		
Occupational stability and mobility.							
H4; Boko Haram insurgency has	5	15	10	80	190	60	4,970
Impact on infrastructural dev.	1.67%	5%	3.33%	26.67%	63.33%		

H- Hypothesis, F/P=Frequency/Percentage, SD-Strongly disagreed, D-Disagreed, N-Neutral, A-Agreed, SA-Strongly Agreed, and M- Mean SD - Standard Deviation Source: Author's field survey, 2024.

Table 3 shows how the hypotheses developed to guide the study were tested with the frequency, percentage, mean, and standard deviation tools of analysis. Only 3.33% of respondents strongly disagreed that the Boko Haram insurgency has an impact on student enrollment. 5% disagreed, 6.67% were undecided, 25% agreed, and 60% strongly agreed. On the view that the Boko Haram insurgency has an impact on students' academic performance. As shown in table 3, approximately 20% of respondents strongly disagreed with the view that the Boko Haram insurgency has an impact on students' academic performances, 8.33% disagreed, and 5% wished to be neutral, 21.67% agreed, with 58.33% strongly agreeing. Also, as shown in Table 3, 5% of respondents strongly

disagreed with the position that the Boko Haram insurgency has an impact on academic staff occupational stability and mobility, while 6.67% disagreed, 3.33% were neutral, 23.33% agreed, and 61.67% strongly agreed. Furthermore, table 3 shows that 1.67% of respondents strongly disagreed that the Boko Haram insurgency has an impact on infrastructure development, 5% disagreed, 3.33% preferred to remain neutral, 26.67% agreed, and 63.33% strongly agreed. H4 has the highest standard deviation (SD) score of 4,970, while H2 has the lowest standard deviation (SD) score of 3,620. H3 has a mean (M) of 60 for H1, H2, H3, and H4, as well as a standard deviation (SD) score of 4,370. H1 has an average standard deviation (SD) score of 4,150 for H1, H2, and H3. The average for H4 is 3,422.



**Figure 3:** testing the research hypotheses. H-Hypothesis, SD (strongly disagreed), D (disagreed), N (neutral), and A (agreed) SA-Strongly agreed. Source: Author's field survey, 20

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## DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

There is a link between the Boko Haram insurgency and the growth of tertiary education in Nigeria's Northeast region. The dimension of correlation between the duos is negative. The Boko Haram insurgency has reduced the number of students enrolled in tertiary institutions in northeastern Nigeria. From 2015 to 2024.

There was a significant decrease in student enrollment. The retrogressive, and thus negative, correlation between the Boko Haram insurgency and the development of tertiary education in the region was also evident in student academic performance. From 2015 to 2024, the level of failure and poor or unsatisfactory examination performance among students at tertiary institutions in the northeast has fallen short of expectations when compared to the pre-insurgency period.

The insurgency has destroyed numerous facilities, executed capital, and ongoing projects, making studies difficult, particularly in areas where practical experience is required to make knowledge sound. Amounting A negative correlation caused by threats to life and property in the midst of growing insecurity has forced several academic staff working in tertiary institutions in northeast Nigeria to relocate to more secure regions of the country. Some have even moved abroad entirely. From 2015 to 2024, student enrollment decreased significantly, particularly at Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam and the College of Agriculture in Gujba. From 2015 to 2024, the level of student enrollment at the University of Maiduguri and the Federal Polytechnic in Mubi decreased significantly. The insurgency's negative impact on student enrollment was also seen in other tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region, particularly in the most conflict-affected states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe Applicants from other parts of the country have been discouraged from applying for admission to tertiary institutions in the northeast

region due to the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, the majority of the students enrolled in the region's institutions are indigenous to the area where the schools are located. Parents are afraid to send their children to tertiary institutions in the northeast region because of the ongoing insurgency. Several students have died in the insurgency, either on their way to school or within the School premises or while attempting to flee a Boko Haram attack on their school. The attack on the College of Agriculture Gujba in Yobe state, where hundreds of students were killed while sleeping in their dormitories, remains a recent example of insurgent attacks. Repeated bombings at the University of Maiduguri have killed a number of students, including a Lecturer (Professor). The bombing of the Federal Polytechnic students' hostel in Wuro-Fatoji, Mubi Adamawa state, killed a dozen students as well. These incidents contributed to low enrollment and applicants from other regions of the country being hesitant to apply for admission to tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria.

The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria can be seen in the level of academic performance among students at regional tertiary institutions. Poor academic performance of students can be attributed to an unconducive learning environment, making studies difficult for students.

From 2015 to 2024, students at the University of Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, College of Agriculture Gujba, and Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Giedam reported poor exam performance due to the Boko Haram insurgency. Academic activities have been disrupted at various times due to an unexpected attack by Boko Haram insurgents. The academic calendar has been obstructed by unexpected attacks, resulting in a delay in graduation and distortion of previously acquired knowledge by students. Students have experienced psychological trauma.

Feelings and minds have also led to poor or lack of concentration in studies due to fear of an attack by

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Boko Haram fighters, resulting in poor examination performance on the part of students. The number of examination failures is rapidly increasing as a result of poor performance caused by fear of Boko Haram.

The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's northeastern region has also had a negative impact on academic staff occupational stability. The impact of the insurgency on teaching staff occupational stability has resulted in significant mobility of academic staff from tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East. The work environment is not secure. Academic staff, like students, carry out their duties in fear of being attacked by Boko Haram insurgents. Insufficient security some academic staff have been discouraged from continuing to work in institutions in the North East region.

Between 2015 and 2024, several academic staff left tertiary institutions in the North-East region for those in more secure regions of the country. Others have even left Nigeria to work as lecturers in other tertiary institutions. Few lessons appear to have been drawn from such occupational mobility and the exodus of academic staff from institutions in Nigeria's North-East region, which has had a negative impact on the development of tertiary education at the level. The government has not devised alternative methods of discouraging academic staff in the region's tertiary institutions from harboring the desire to leave for security reasons.

Risk allowance has not been provided for those who are available, and their lives and those of their families are not insured against a possible attack by the Boko Haram insurgency. Experienced academic staff who have left due to the Boko Haram insurgency have been replaced by inexperienced and unqualified individuals in some North-East institutions. The departure of experienced academic staff and their replacement by inexperienced ones has resulted in a decline in the quality of tertiary education in Nigeria's North-East region. Prior to Boko Haram, the University of Maiduguri was among the top ten universities in the

Nigerian University Commission's (NUC) national rankings.

Between 2015 and 2024, the region experienced an insurgency, which decreased to forty-five and then fifty. The majority of academic staff available in tertiary institutions in the region now are not only indigenous to the region, but also those who have replaced experienced departing ones, not because they have a natural zeal for teaching, but because they want to benefit from overseas training and conferences provided by the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) through tertiary institutions. The departure of experienced and qualified academic staff has resulted in the loss of knowledge and productivity among academic staff and students in Nigeria's North-East region.

## MAJOR FINDINGS

The study found that:

- Boko Haram's insurgency has a negative impact on tertiary education in Nigeria's North-East region.
- Between 2015 and 2024, the Boko Haram insurgency significantly reduced student enrollment in North-East Nigeria's tertiary institutions.
- The Boko Haram insurgency has discouraged applicants from other regions of Nigeria from seeking admission to tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria.
- Due to the Boko Haram insurgency, the majority of students in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria are from the local community.
- The Boko Haram insurgency has made the learning environment unsuitable for students at tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region.
- Fear of an attack by Boko Haram insurgents can cause psychological trauma,

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affecting students' concentration and attention to their studies. Tertiary institutions in Nigeria's northeast region.

- The Boko Haram insurgency has disrupted the academic calendar of tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria from 2015 to 2024.
- From 2015 to 2024, the Boko Haram insurgency negatively impacted student performance in tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East.
- In North-East Nigeria, a shortage of experienced academic staff has led to inexperienced replacements, affecting teaching standards and quality.
- The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North-East region poses a threat to academic staff and their families.
- Academic staff in North-East Nigeria do not receive risk allowances or have insurance coverage.
- From 2015 to 2024, the Boko Haram insurgency destroyed academic facilities aimed at promoting tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.
- Boko Haram insurgents destroyed capital projects for tertiary education in North-East Nigeria between 2015 and 2024.
- The Boko Haram insurgency has hampered infrastructure development in tertiary institutions in the North East region between 2015 and 2024.
- The Boko Haram insurgency has negatively impacted the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the major findings, the study concluded that from 2015 to 2024, the Boko Haram insurgency has negatively affected student enrollment rates in tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region. It

also found that the insurgency has adversely impacted the academic performance of students in these institutions during the same period. Additionally, the study concluded that many experienced and qualified academic staff have left institutions in the region for schools in more secure areas due to the Boko Haram insurgency. The study further concluded that from 2015 to 2024, repeated attacks by Boko Haram insurgents have resulted in the destruction of facilities and infrastructure in tertiary institutions in the region. Consequently, the study determined that the Boko Haram insurgency has had a negative impact on the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria during this period. As a result of the conclusion drawn by the study, the following recommendations are made:

- Adequate security measures should be implemented in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria. An intelligent network-based security system is more necessary than just the presence of armed military personnel. A larger number of plainclothes intelligence officers should be deployed to these institutions. They should blend in with students, academic and non-academic staff, and the entire institution community. This interaction will facilitate the acquisition of firsthand information on any plans by Boko Haram insurgents to attack these institutions, making it easier to take precautions against potential threats. This measure is crucial as the insurgents are not ghosts but humans who have suicide bombers among the population. Identifying these individuals and uncovering their plans for attacks can be achieved through effective intelligence services, leading to the adoption of necessary measures to prevent such attacks. Utilizing secret security services in institutions in the North-East region will significantly reduce the frequency and severity of attacks, thereby promoting the development of higher education in the region.
- Establishing military camps near tertiary

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institutions and stationing soldiers there can make these schools more vulnerable to attacks by Boko Haram insurgents. In instances where military camps have been attacked, nearby institutions often became shelters for the insurgents, allowing them to escape the government's disproportionate use of force. In many attacks, government forces have aggressively entered institutions in pursuit of insurgents, causing collateral damage to students, academic facilities, and infrastructure intended to promote higher education in Nigeria's North-East region. Several students have been caught in crossfires and killed while trying to escape, and Boko Haram fighters, when over powered, have used schools as escape routes, often destroying facilities out of aggression. Examples include the attacks on the Polytechnic at Geidam and the College of Agriculture Gujba in Yobe state, which were made vulnerable due to their proximity to military camps. Therefore, in addition to implementing effective intelligence and security services within institutions, adopting aerial surveillance is crucial. This approach can detect and neutralize insurgent regrouping from afar before they can approach the institutions, thereby making these schools safer and supporting the growth of tertiary education in Nigeria's North-East region. Effective multi-track peace-building mechanisms should be adopted rather than military action to ending the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North-East region. Though Boko Haram operates mostly in a "hit and run" manner which is making it difficult to understand with whom peace deal is to be negotiated on their behalf. The government should willing request that Boko Haram nominates certain persons to negotiate with it

on enduring peace and security in the region. This will lead to a safer region capable of creating conducive atmosphere for teaching and learning leading to the development of tertiary education in the region. Safer North-East region will also ameliorate the problem of attack and destruction of academic facilities as well as infrastructures meant for the development of tertiary education in the region.

- Tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria, particularly in states vulnerable to Boko Haram insurgency like Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, predominantly enroll local students since many applicants from other regions avoid applying to schools in these areas. However, local students also deserve protection in their educational pursuits. To ensure their safety, the government should provide life insurance for students, demonstrating a commitment to securing their lives and compensating their families in the event of an attack by Boko Haram insurgents. Additionally, the government should cover medical expenses for students injured in conflicts between government forces and Boko Haram. Such measures would show that the government is serious about protecting students, reassuring families and potentially reducing the reluctance of parents from outside the region to send their children to institutions in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Academic staff also deserve adequate security and maximum protection to be able to deliver their official primary and secondary responsible very well. Several among them for fear of attack by Boko Haram insurgents have left institutions in the region from 2015 to 2024. Shortage of teaching staff has made the development of tertiary education

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difficult. Few who have not left should be encouraged to remain. This encouragement can be done through initiating special risk allowance package for available academic staff. Special risk allowance package for them will enable them realize the fact that the government is aware and concern about their plight and the fact that they discharged their duties under severe risk and threat promoted by Boko Haram insurgency in the region they work in.

- The government should ensure that the lives of academic staff and their immediate families are insured. By providing life insurance packages, the government can instill confidence among the staff, knowing that in the event of an attack or death caused by Boko Haram insurgents, their medical expenses or life compensation will be covered. This measure will discourage academic staff from leaving institutions in the North-East region for safer areas in Nigeria or abroad. Encouraging academic staff in this manner will reduce their occupational mobility, preventing the loss of qualified and experienced personnel. Effective life insurance packages will help retain skilled academic staff in the region, ultimately fostering the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.
- The North-East Development Commission (NEDC), which is tasked with human capital and infrastructural development in Nigeria's North-East region, should invest in the infrastructural development of public tertiary institutions, particularly in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. This initiative would complement the efforts of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund), which is already actively involved in enhancing infrastructure in

public tertiary institutions within the region. Such collaboration would accelerate the pace of infrastructural development in these institutions. Rebuilding destroyed academic facilities such as engineering workshops, entrepreneurship development centers, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) centers, laboratories, classrooms, and administrative offices is crucial for advancing tertiary education in the region. The insurgency has heavily damaged these facilities, especially in the three most affected states. While TETFund is making significant strides in rebuilding and initiating new projects, additional support and investment from the NEDC would ensure the adequacy of academic facilities and infrastructure, fostering overall development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.

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